Unit Demand Auction Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Objects Auction
一类异质物品拍卖机制收益等价性及应用

Symmetric Bayesin game theory is usually adopted to select a suitable kind of payment from Winner-pay and All-pay for a special case of heterogeneous object auction where different objects have relatedvalue and it is also widely used in Internet advertisement-place auctions and the activities of contest prize allocation.In this paper,we assume that each bidder has only one chance to summit a bid during a heterogeneous object auction.We mainly prove that the seller gains the same expected revenue in Winner-pay and All-pay auctions.However,bidders bid more aggressively in Winner-pay auction than in the other auction.Moreover,we specify our model to the single object auction and multi-unit homogeneous objects auction respectively,and conclude that seller's expected revenue is equal to k 1 sealed auction in k unit homogeneous objects auction.