| [1] | Dawes RM (1980) Social dilemmas. Annu Rev Psychol 31: 169–193.
|
| [2] | Croson R, Fatas E, Neugebauer T (2005) Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games. Econ Lett 87: 95–101.
|
| [3] | Croson RTA (2007) Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games. Econ Inq 45: 199–216.
|
| [4] | Ostrom E (1998) A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. Am Polit Sci Rev 92: 1–22.
|
| [5] | Bogaert S, Boone C, Declerck C (2008) Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A review and conceptual model. Br J Soc Psychol 47: 453–480.
|
| [6] | Messick DM, McClintock CG (1968) Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. J Exp Soc Psychol 4: 1–25.
|
| [7] | Camerer CF, Fehr E (2006) When does “economic man” dominate social behavior? Science 311: 47–52.
|
| [8] | Brekke KA, Hauge KE, Lind JT, Nyborg K (2011) Playing with the good guys: A public good game with endogenous group formation. J Publ Econ 95: 1111–1118.
|
| [9] | Gunnthorsdottir A, Houser D, McCabe K (2007) Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments. J Econ Behav Organ 62: 304–315.
|
| [10] | G？chter S, Th？ni C (2005) Social learning and voluntary learning and voluntary cooperation among like-minded people. J Eur Econ Assoc 3: 303–314.
|
| [11] | Ledyard JO (1995) Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In: Kagel JH, Roth AE, editors, The handbook of experimental economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 111–194.
|
| [12] | North DC (1998) Where have we been and where are we going? In: Ben-Ner A, Putterman L, editors, Economics, Values and Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
|
| [13] | Lichbach MI (1997) The cooperator’s dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
|
| [14] | Miller G (2000) Rational choice and dysfunctional institutions. Governance 13: 535–547.
|
| [15] | Rothstein B (2000) Trust, social dilemmas and collective memories. J Theor Polit 12: 477–501.
|
| [16] | Funder D (2006) Towards a resolution of the personality triad: Persons, situations, and behaviors. J Res Pers 40: 21–34.
|
| [17] | Young HP (2001) Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton University Press.
|
| [18] | Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press.
|
| [19] | North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
|
| [20] | Ostrom E (2005) Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press.
|
| [21] | Herrmann B, Th？ni C, G？chter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319: 1362–1367.
|
| [22] | Hoff K, Stiglitz JE (2004) After the big bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies. Am Econ Rev 94: 753–763.
|
| [23] | Burns TR, Dietz T (1992) Cultural evolution: Social rule systems, selection and human agency. Int Sociol 7: 259–283.
|
| [24] | Carneiro RL, Carneiro R (2003) Evolutionism in cultural anthropology: A critical history. Westview Press.
|
| [25] | Binmore K (2005) Natural justice. Oxford University Press, USA.
|
| [26] | Casari M, Plott CR (2003) Decentralized management of common property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. J Econ Behav Organ 51: 217–247.
|
| [27] | Cinyabuguma M, Page T, Putterman L (2005) Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. J Publ Econ 89: 1421–1435.
|
| [28] | Kosfeld M, Okada A, Riedl A (2009) Institution formation in public goods games. Am Econ Rev 99: 1335–1355.
|
| [29] | Kroll S, Cherry TL, Shogren JF (2007) Voting, punishment, and public goods. Econ Inq 45: 557–570.
|
| [30] | Walker JM, Gardner R, Herr A, Ostrom E (2000) Collective choice in the commons: Experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes. Econ J 110: 212–234.
|
| [31] | Yamagishi T (1986) The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J Pers Soc Psychol 51: 110–116.
|
| [32] | Wenzel M (2002) The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax compliance: The role of taxpayers’ identity. J Appl Psychol 87: 629–645.
|
| [33] | Price ME, Cosmides L, Tooby J (2002) Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. Evol Hum Behav 23: 203–231.
|
| [34] | Ertan A, Page T, Putterman L (2009) Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem. Eur Econ Rev 53: 495–511.
|
| [35] | Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games, and common-pool resources. University of Michigan Press.
|
| [36] | Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2008) Winners don’t punish. Nature 452: 348–351.
|
| [37] | Fehr E, G？chter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90: 980–994.
|
| [38] | Nikiforakis N (2008) Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? J Publ Econ 92: 91–112.
|
| [39] | Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. Am Polit Sci Rev 86: 404–417.
|
| [40] | Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2009) Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science 325: 1272–1275.
|
| [41] | Gürerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312: 108–111.
|
| [42] | Janssen MA, Holahan R, Lee A, Ostrom E (2010) Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems. Science 328: 613–617.
|
| [43] | Chekroun P, Brauer M (2002) The bystander effect and social control behavior: The effect of the presence of others on people’s reactions to norm violations. Eur J Soc Psychol 32: 853–867.
|
| [44] | Chaurand N, Brauer M (2008) What determines social control? People’s reactions to counternormative behaviors in urban environments. J Appl Soc Psychol 38: 1689–1715.
|
| [45] | Brauer M, Chaurand N (2010) Descriptive norms, prescriptive norms, and social control: An intercultural comparison of people’s reactions to uncivil behaviors. Eur J Soc Psychol 40: 490–499.
|
| [46] | Palfrey TR (2009) Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy. Annu Rev Polit Sci 12: 379–388.
|
| [47] | Fehr E, Gachter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137–140.
|
| [48] | Fowler JH (2005) Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102: 7047–7049.
|
| [49] | Frank RH (1987) If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience? Am Econ Rev 77: 593–604.
|
| [50] | Frank R (1988) Passions within reason. New York: WW Norton & Co.
|
| [51] | Gintis H (2003) Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evol Hum Behav 24: 153–172.
|
| [52] | Cesarini D, Dawes CT, Fowler JH, Johannesson M, Lichtenstein P, et al. (2008) Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust game. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 105: 3721–3726.
|
| [53] | Cesarini D, Dawes CT, Johannesson M, Lichtenstein P, Wallace B (2009) Genetic variation in preferences for giving and risk taking. Q J Econ 124: 809–842.
|
| [54] | Kollock P (1998) Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annu Rev Sociol 24: 183–214.
|
| [55] | Berggren N, Jordahl H (2006) Free to trust: Economic freedom and social capital. Kyklos 59: 141–169.
|
| [56] | Henrich J, McElreath R, Barr A, Ensminger J, Barrett C, et al. (2006) Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312: 1767–1770.
|
| [57] | Henrich J, Ensminger J, McElreath R, Barr A, Barrett C, et al. (2010) Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment. Science 327: 1480–1484.
|
| [58] | Ostrom E (2008) Developing a method for analyzing institutional change. In: Batie S, Mercuro N, editors, Alternative institutional structures evolution and impact, London: Routledge.
|
| [59] | Lambsdorff JG (2008) Corruption perceptions index 2007. In: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2008, Berlin: Cambridge University Press.
|
| [60] | Rothstein B (2005) Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
|
