%0 Journal Article
%T An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
%A MONTERO
%A JUAN-PABLO
%J Cuadernos de econom¨ªa
%D 2007
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%R 10.4067/S0717-68212007000200001
%X efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. this paper discuses further properties of the mechanism including its extension to the possibility of private externalities and non-transferability of licences
%K externalities
%K asymmetric information
%K uniform-price auction.
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0717-68212007000200001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en