%0 Journal Article
%T Bienes sociales primarios versus utilidad
%A Venezia
%A Luciano
%J An£¿£¿lisis filos£¿3fico
%D 2007
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%X in the present paper i argue that the specific arguments developed by john rawls to justify the standard of social primary goods do not succeed. in the first place i develop and criticize the rawlsian arguments grounded in antidiscriminatory intuitions and the fact of reasonable pluralism. i also characterize and criticize rawls's ideas concerning the scope of the concept of fairness as well as his argument concerning extensive tastes and responsibility for ends. i believe that they do not justify a resourcist distribuendum. on the contrary, i argue that such considerations support a welfarist standard. the reason is that a welfarist standard successfully deals with the difficulties rawls mentions in favoring the resourcist standard of social primary goods.
%K "justice as fairness"
%K social primary goods
%K utility
%K reasonable pluralism
%K fairness.
%U http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S1851-96362007000200005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en