%0 Journal Article
%T Desemprego e flexibilidade de sal¨¢rios em um contexto evolucion¨¢rio
%A Soromenho
%A Jorge Eduardo de Castro
%A Silveira
%A Jaylson Jair da
%J Estudos Econ£¿micos (S£¿o Paulo)
%D 2011
%I Instituto de Pesquisas Econ?micas da FEA-USP
%R 10.1590/S0101-41612011000200003
%X we make use of an evolutionary game approach to study the relation between wage flexibility and unemployment in an economy with decentralized wage bargains. in our model, labor unions pick a nominal wage out of a finite set with cardinality in each period, while firms choose employment levels that maximize their profits. we are able to show that: 1) the economy presents multiple equilibria, some are characterized by homogeneity of nominal wages (pure strategy equilibrium) and others by heterogeneity of nominal wages (mixed strategy equilibrium); 2) the medium-run equilibrium is selected by a social learning process, given by a replicator dynamics; and 3) the selected medium-run equilibrium may not be the full employment equilibrium.
%K keynesian model
%K unemployment
%K evolutionary games.
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0101-41612011000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en