%0 Journal Article
%T ESQUEMAS DE INCENTIVOS Y CARTERAS DE INVERSI¨®N INNOVADORAS
%A LOYOLA
%A GINO
%A PORTILLA
%A YOLANDA
%J Estudios de econom¨ªa
%D 2010
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%R 10.4067/S0718-52862010000100003
%X this article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. in particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.
%K executive compensation
%K delegated portfolio management
%K non-monotone incentive schemes
%K non-monotone likelihood ratio property.
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0718-52862010000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en