%0 Journal Article
%T When Externalism And Privileged Self-Knowledge Are Compatible And When They Are Not
%A Borgoni
%A Cristina
%J EPISTEME
%D 2009
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%X this paper is dedicated to the incompatibilist debate between externalism and privileged self-knowledge, such as it appears in the literature under two privileged contexts of discussion: the slow-switching cases and the reductio ad absurdum arguments. my aim is to defend a compatibilist position although recognising some exceptions to it. i will defend, on the one hand, that the incompatibilism reached by slow-switching cases is sustained only in case we maintain a specific but problematical view about self-knowledge. on the other hand, the incompatibilism reached by reductio ad absurdum arguments is only sustained if we maintain a narrow conception of externalism.
%K incompatibilism
%K slow-switching cases
%K reductio of compatibilism.
%U http://www.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0798-43242009000100001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en