%0 Journal Article
%T Frege and numbers as self-subsistent objects
%A Lavers
%A Gregory
%J Discusiones Filos¨®ficas
%D 2010
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%X this paper argues that frege is not the metaphysical platonist about mathematics that he is standardly taken to be. it is shown that frege's project has two distinct stages: the identification of what is true of our ordinary notions, and then the provision of a systematic account that shares the identified features. neither of these stages involves much metaphysics. the paper criticizes in detail dummett's interpretation of ˇěˇě55-61 of grundlagen. these sections fall under the heading 'every number is a self-subsistent object' and are described by dummett as containing the worst arguments put forward by frege. it is argued that essentially all of dummett's interpretive points are mistaken. finally, i show that frege's claims about the independence of mathematics from humans and their activities does not commit him to any particularly metaphysical position either.
%K dummett
%K frege
%K grundlagen
%K independence of mathematics
%K metaphysical platonism.
%U http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0124-61272010000200006&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en