%0 Journal Article %T 政府、企业、消费者关于绿色生产的三方博弈
The Tripartite Game between the Government, Enterprises and Consumers on Green Production %A 王欣月 %A 李军祥 %A 王昕 %J Modeling and Simulation %P 685-698 %@ 2324-870X %D 2025 %I Hans Publishing %R 10.12677/mos.2025.144321 %X 一直以来，企业的生产行为都是多方关注、多方投入的重要命题。为了探究政、企、消费者三方决策的相互关系，寻求新时代政企平衡、绿色生产的新机遇，本文立足于目前生产消费环境，构建了以政府、企业为主体的演化博弈模型后，引入了相关消费者决策影响因素，并分析了三方的决策影响关系和不同决策下的收益，最终在Matlab2019中对三个主体进行不同策略环境下的仿真推演。并得出以下结论：政府引导企业绿色生产行为上，无论是监管还是补贴，都可提高企业选择绿色生产的概率，但是其促进效果会在超过一定范围后逐渐削弱；因市场相关性前提，消费者的策略行为受政企双方决策影响不大；企业的生产决策存在边界值，而若无政府积极引导，企业大概率会选择传统生产；企业的生产决策会反作用于政府决策，形成制衡关系。
For a long time, the production behavior of enterprises has been an important proposition of multi-party attention and multi-party investment. In order to explore the interrelationship between the decision-making of the government, enterprises and consumers, and seek new opportunities for the balance between government and enterprises and green production in the new era, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with the government and enterprises as the main body based on the current production and consumption environment, introduces the relevant consumer decision-making influencing factors, analyzes the decision-making influence relationship of the three parties and the benefits under different decisions, and finally simulates the three subjects in different strategic environments in Matlab2019. The following conclusions are drawn: the government’s guidance of enterprises’ green production behavior, whether it is supervision or subsidies, can increase the probability of enterprises choosing green production, but its promotion effect will gradually weaken after exceeding a certain range; due to the premise of market relevance, consumers’ strategic behavior is not greatly affected by the decisions of both government and enterprises. There is a boundary value in the production decision of enterprises, and if there is no active guidance from the government, enterprises are likely to choose traditional production; the production decision of the enterprise will react to the government’s decision-making, forming a relationship of checks and balances. %K 政府监管， %K 企业决策， %K 演化博弈， %K 仿真分析
Government Regulation %K Business Decision-Making %K Evolutionary Game %K Simulation Analysis %U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=112471