%0 Journal Article
%T 碳减排机制下供应链决策的演化博弈分析<br>Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Decision under Carbon Reduction Mechanism
%A 何明萱
%J Modern Management
%P 101-111
%@ 2160-732X
%D 2025
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/mm.2025.154091
%X 面对全球气候变暖的挑战&#65292;碳减排成为各国政府和企业的重要议题。本文以制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链为背景&#65292;通过零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型&#65292;构建了制造商和零售商的博弈支付矩阵。利用演化博弈理论&#65292;探讨在碳减排机制下供应链中各参与方的决策演化过程。通过数值实验分析了对演化结果的影响因素。研究表明&#65292;在低碳生产与销售过程中&#65292;只有一个参与者(制造商或零售商)采用低碳行为&#65292;二者不同时采用低碳策略&#65307;零售商低碳订购水平与制造商低碳生产水平呈相反关系。零售商与制造商配合发展低碳经济&#65292;双方才能获利更大。<br>Faced with the challenge of global warming, carbon reduction has become an important issue for governments and enterprises. Based on the background of the two-level supply chain consisting of manufacturers and retailers, this paper constructs the game payment matrix of manufacturers and retailers through the Stackelberg game model. Using evolutionary game theory, the paper discusses the decision-making evolution process of each participant in the supply chain under the carbon emission reduction mechanism. The factors influencing the evolution results are analyzed by numerical experiments. Research shows that in the process of low-carbon production and sales, only one participant (manufacturer or retailer) adopts low-carbon behavior. The low carbon level of retailers is inversely related to that of manufacturers. Retailers and manufacturers will benefit more if they work together to develop a low-carbon economy.
%K 碳减排&#65292
%K 供应链决策&#65292
%K Stackelberg博弈&#65292
%K 演化博弈<br>Carbon Emission Reduction
%K Supply Chain Decision
%K Stackelberg Game
%K Evolutionary Game
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=111903