%0 Journal Article
%T 基于演化博弈的助农直播电商策略研究
Research on Agricultural Live-Streaming E-Commerce Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
%A 李庆杰
%J E-Commerce Letters
%P 253-258
%@ 2168-5851
%D 2025
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/ecl.2025.144885
%X 助农直播作为扶贫新举措，在促进销售的同时存在着产品质量把控不严等问题，这主要是平台监管不力与主播以次充好导致的。为研究主播的产品质量策略与平台的监管策略，本文基于演化博弈理论分析模型，以有限理性的视角，将平台与主播之间的策略选择抽象为博弈主体的合作与利益冲突，同时假设平台对主播设置奖惩标准，从而探究二者的策略选择与动态演化过程。研究结果表明：助农直播市场的动态系统将逐渐走向不监督、高质量的均衡状态。奖惩制度能够有效促进助农产品销售进入良性状态。未来直播平台应落实奖惩制度，对助农直播的产品质量进行监督，从而引导助农主播转向高质量的产品策略。
As a new initiative for poverty alleviation, the live broadcast to help farmers has problems such as lax product quality control while promoting sales, which is mainly caused by the platform’s ineffective supervision and the anchor’s substandard quality. In order to study the anchor’s product quality strategy and the platform’s supervision strategy, this paper is based on the evolutionary game theory analysis model, with a limited rationality perspective, the strategic choice between the platform and the anchor is abstracted as the cooperation and conflict of interests of the game subjects, and at the same time, it is assumed that the platform sets the reward and punishment standard for the anchors, so as to explore the strategic choice and the dynamic evolution process of the two. The results of the study show that the dynamic system of the live broadcasting market will gradually move towards an unsupervised, high-quality equilibrium state. The reward and punishment system can effectively promote the sales of agricultural products into a benign state. In the future, live broadcasting platforms should implement the reward and punishment system to supervise the quality of the products of the farm-aided live broadcasts, so as to guide the farm-aided anchors to shift to high-quality product strategies.
%K 助农直播，
%K 直播电商，
%K 演化博弈，
%K 策略
Rural Live-Streaming
%K Live-Streaming E-Commerce
%K Evolutionary Game Theory
%K Strategy
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=111135