%0 Journal Article
%T 再探罗素对空名问题的解决
Further Exploration of Russell’s Solution to the Problem of Empty Names
%A 杨悦怡
%J Advances in Philosophy
%P 113-118
%@ 2169-2602
%D 2025
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/acpp.2025.143103
%X 在哲学逻辑发展的进程中，因日常语言词义的扩张性，含摹状词语句的指称与意义的界定长期成为学界争论之焦点。罗素对空名问题的解决无疑为哲学开启了新的研究角度，这一理论成功攻克了关于存在的难题、排中律失效难题以及同一性难题，为哲学研究提供了清晰的分析路径。但结合摹状词理论提出后仍然受到质疑来看，其理论本身尚存在问题。本文力图从语言与逻辑之“间”的角度探索摹状词理论的底层逻辑与其在同一率运用中存在的语词和语句混用问题，由此得出隐藏于理论背后所遵循的主谓关系。
In the development process of philosophical logic, due to the ambiguity of everyday language expressions, the definition of reference and meaning in sentences containing descriptive words has long been a focus of academic debate. Russell’s solution to the problem of empty names undoubtedly opened up a new research perspective for philosophy. This theory successfully overcame the difficulties of existence, the failure of the law of excluded middle, and the problem of identity, providing a clear analytical path for philosophical research. However, even after being proposed in conjunction with the theory of description, it is still questioned, indicating that there are still issues with the theory itself. This article attempts to explore the underlying logic of the theory of description and the problem of word and sentence mixing in the application of the same rate from the perspective of the “gap” between language and logic, in order to derive the subject verb relationship hidden behind the theory.
%K 空名，
%K 摹状词，
%K 语言，
%K 逻辑
Empty Name
%K Description
%K Language
%K Logic
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=109497