%0 Journal Article %T 静态碳税条件下政府与车企的演化博弈分析——基于前景理论
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Automobile Enterprises under Static Carbon Tax Conditions—Based on Prospect Theory %A 林玉良 %A 李军祥 %A 邹敬涵 %J Modeling and Simulation %P 373-388 %@ 2324-870X %D 2025 %I Hans Publishing %R 10.12677/mos.2025.142159 %X 随着全球气候变化的紧迫性日益凸显，中国作为世界上最大的汽车生产和消费国，面临着减少碳排放的巨大挑战。在此背景下，新能源汽车(NEVs)的发展成为实现“碳达峰”和“碳中和”目标的关键途径。本研究旨在分析静态碳税条件下，政府与新能源汽车制造商之间的演化博弈策略和互动机制。基于前景理论，构建了一个演化博弈模型，模拟了地方政府和汽车制造商在不同碳税政策下的行为策略选择。研究首先概述了中国新能源汽车产业的发展现状和政策背景，然后通过引入前景理论，提高了博弈双方增益函数的精度。模型分析了地方政府的监管选择与汽车制造商的生产决策之间的相互作用，以及这些互动如何影响新能源汽车产业的演化稳定状态(ESS)。研究发现，在静态碳税下，系统可能不存在稳定点，表明需要更灵活的政策工具来促进产业的健康发展。本研究的政策建议包括：开发碳排放核算技术，为新能源汽车行业提供稳定的经济回报；建立动态碳税体系，减轻新能源汽车业务的成本负担；提高公众的低碳出行意识，并通过量化消费者的减排量来鼓励购买新能源汽车。此外，研究强调了政府与制造商合作的重要性，以及在碳税政策设计中考虑消费者低碳偏好的必要性。
With the increasing urgency of global climate change, China, as the world’s largest producer and consumer of automobiles, faces a huge challenge in reducing carbon emissions. In this context, the development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) has become a key pathway to achieving the goals of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality”. This study aims to analyze the evolutionary game strategies and interactive mechanisms between the government and new energy vehicle manufacturers under static carbon tax conditions. Based on prospect theory, an evolutionary game model was constructed to simulate the behavioral strategy choices of local governments and automobile manufacturers under different carbon tax policies. The study first outlined the current development status and policy background of China’s new energy vehicle industry, and then improved the accuracy of the gain functions of both parties in the game by introducing prospect theory. The model analyzed the interaction between the regulatory choices of local governments and the production decisions of automobile manufacturers, and how these interactions affect the evolutionary stability state (ESS) of the new energy vehicle industry. Research has found that under a static carbon tax, there may not be a stable point in the system, indicating the need for more flexible policy tools to promote the healthy development of industries. The policy recommendations of this study include developing carbon emission accounting technology to provide stable economic returns for the new energy vehicle industry; Establish a dynamic carbon tax system to reduce the cost burden of new energy vehicle business; Raise public awareness of low-carbon travel and encourage the purchase of new energy vehicles by quantifying consumer emissions reductions. In addition, the study emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the government and manufacturers, %K 碳税机制， %K 新能源汽车， %K 演化博弈， %K 前景理论
Carbon Tax Mechanism %K New Energy Vehicles %K Evolutionary Game Theory %K Prospect Theory %U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=108207