%0 Journal Article %T 基于计划行为理论的企业员工创新行为演化博弈研究
Research on the Evolutionary Game of Employees’ Innovation Behavior Based on the Theory of Planning Behavior %A 李晓玲 %A 李锐 %A 包瑜 %A 向玉 %A 蒋昊伦 %J Sustainable Development %P 1078-1090 %@ 2160-7559 %D 2024 %I Hans Publishing %R 10.12677/sd.2024.144122 %X 在计划行为理论框架下,充分考虑员工创新行为成本排他性和成果正外部性的特点,对员工创新行为的物质、精神等方面进行了多元利益分析,运用演化博弈的方法对员工创新行为策略选择的内在机理进行了探讨。研究发现:当群体合作创新的收益高于搭便车收益,且至少一个群体进行单独创新的综合收益高于成本时,系统最终演化的结果为博弈双方均选择创新策略;当群体单独进行创新的收益不足以弥补成本,但合作创新的收益高于搭便车收益时,系统最终演化结果取决于系统初始状态。因此,建立合理的激励机制、营造支持创新的组织氛围,为员工创新提供支持均有益于系统向博弈双方均选择创新策略方向演化。
Under the framework of the theory of planned behavior, fully considering the characteristics of cost exclusivity and positive externalities of employees’ innovative behaviors, the material and spiritual aspects of employees’ innovative behaviors are analyzed, and the internal mechanism of employees’ innovative behavior strategy selection is discussed by using the method of evolutionary game. The results show that when the benefits of group cooperative innovation are higher than the benefits of free-riding, and the comprehensive benefits of at least one group of individual innovation are higher than the costs, the final evolution result of the system is that both sides of the game choose the innovation strategy, and when the benefits of group innovation alone are not enough to make up for the costs, but the benefits of cooperative innovation are higher than the benefits of free-riding, the final evolution result of the system depends on the initial state of the system. Therefore, the establishment of a reasonable incentive mechanism, the creation of an organizational atmosphere that supports innovation, and the support for employee innovation are all conducive to the evolution of the system to the direction of innovation strategy chosen by both sides of the game. %K 创新行为,正外部性,群体规范,演化博弈,计划行为理论
Innovative Behavior %K Positive Externalities %K Group Norms %K Evolutionary Game %K Planned Behavior Theory %U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=86149