%0 Journal Article
%T 从“知觉”角度探析梅洛–庞蒂对经验论和唯理论的批判<br>Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism of Empiricism and Rationalism from the Perspective of the “Perception”
%A 李春
%J Advances in Philosophy
%P 173-179
%@ 2169-2602
%D 2024
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/ACPP.2024.131027
%X 梅洛–庞蒂认为，经验论和唯理论都没有真正理解知觉的原初意义，即知觉是作为一种人与世界的原初关联活动。基于此，梅洛–庞蒂采取了与传统认识论所不一样的方式去构建其知觉理论框架，他提出知觉在先、现象在先，以身体–主体作为一种媒介，强调了知觉的首要地位。梅洛–庞蒂对于经验论和唯理论知觉观的批判，其目的是力图重返现象世界，也就是回归到物自身上来，以此超越经验论和唯理论知觉观。<br />
In Merleau-Ponty’s opinion, empiricism and rationalism neither really understand the original meaning of perception, that is, perception is the original connection between man and the world. Here, Merleau-Ponty adopts a different way from the traditional epistemology to construct the theoretical framework of perception. He puts forward that perception comes first and phenomenon comes first, and takes body-subject as a medium to emphasize the primacy of perception. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of empiricism and rationalism is aimed at returning to the phenomenal world, that is, to the thing itself, so as to surpass empiricism and rationalism.
%K 感觉，知性，知觉，现象<br>Feeling
%K Intellectuality
%K Perception
%K Phenomenon
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=79662