%0 Journal Article
%T Prosocial Behavior and the Individual Normative Standard of Fairness within a Dynamic Context: Experimental Evidence
%A Rati Mekvabishvili
%A Elguja Mekvabishvili
%A Marine Natsvaladze
%A Rusudan Sirbiladze
%A Giorgi Mzhavanadze
%A Salome Deisadze
%J Open Journal of Social Sciences
%P 204-221
%@ 2327-5960
%D 2023
%I Scientific Research Publishing
%R 10.4236/jss.2023.113014
%X In this paper, we present an experimental study of prosocial behavior and
individual normative standards of fairness under the novel context of a dynamic
dictator game. In addition, we explore the role of informal institutions in shaping
individualsĄŻ cooperation within the domain of a public goods game under its
direct exposure and in subsequent prosociality beyond its reach in the domain
of the dictator game. We find that dictatorsĄŻ average offers in our study are
quite close to the typical results found in other dictator game experiments and
they are quite stable over two periods. However, dictators become more selfish
after they have had the experience of playing a public goods game with peer
punishment. Interestingly, we found that dictators act significantly more
selfishly relative to their own declared individual normative standard of fairness.
Furthermore, our experiment reveals a large share of antisocial punishment in
the public goods game and a peer-to-peer punishment mechanism to be an
inefficient tool to promote cooperation, however in an environment that rules
out a suitable normative consensus and collective choice.
%K Dictator Game
%K Individual Normative Standard of Fairness
%K Dynamics of Behavior
%K Spillover
%K Prosociality
%K Public Goods Game
%U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=123751