%0 Journal Article
%T The Ontology of Free Will in the Post-Classical Maturidite Kal¨¡m: Analysis, Critical Edition and Translation of Sa£¿akliz¨¡de¡¯s Treatise on Free Will
%A Hayrettin Nebi G¨¹dekli
%J -
%D 2019
%X This article examines a treatise titled Ris¨¡lat al-ir¨¡da al-juz£¿iyya by Sa£¿akliz¨¡de Mehmed Efendi (d. 1145/1732), an eighteenth-century Ottoman scholar. It addresses how the dilemma between God¡¯s creation of things and human free will is resolved through an investigation into the ontology of free will; it also includes a critical edition and translation of the treatise. Sa£¿akliz¨¡de examined the problem of human agency, which had been one of the most debated subjects in kal¨¡m since the beginning, through a new theory of action that was developed by £¿adr al-Shar¨©£¿a ¡®Ubaydall¨¡h b. Mas£¿¨±d (d. 747/1346), a post-classical Maturidi theologian. Sa£¿akliz¨¡de analyzed separately the infinitive meanings of action and the meaning of the infinitive¡¯s outcome and inquired into their ontological meanings. According to this, the infinitive meaning of an action constitutes its ¡°non-entity aspect,¡± whereas the meaning of the infinitive¡¯s outcome constitutes its ¡°entity aspect.¡± Therefore, the problem of jabr (determinism) from the beginning of theology, as formulated in the syllogism ¡°Human actions are entities¡± / ¡°Everything is created by God¡± / ¡°Therefore, every human actions are created by God,¡± was solved by discovering a non-entity, i.e. non-existent, aspect of the action. In Ris¨¡lat al-ir¨¡da al-juz£¿iyya, Sa£¿akliz¨¡de appropriated £¿adr al-Shar¨©£¿a¡¯s theory of action and applied the separation of the two meanings of an action to the concept of free will (ir¨¡da). Thereby, while not contradicting God¡¯s creation of everything, he tried to explain human free will through the concepts of will, choice and preference. Considering the action¡¯s two meanings as an adjective determining one aspect (al-£¿ifa al-mu£¿a£¿£¿i£¿a) and creating this determining adjective (¨©q¨¡¡®), Sa£¿akliz¨¡de argues that the second meaning corresponds to the preference that stands as the ultimate basis of human actions. The fact that the preference is the basis of free will and the action that comes out of free will raises the question to whom the preference is attributed ultimately. Sa£¿akliz¨¡de argues that the preference is derived from human beings, but, just like ¨©q¨¡¡®, it has an infinitive meaning, and therefore cannot be described by the attributes of existence, absence or being created and so it becomes neither a created thing by God nor human beings. In order to ground human responsibility, Sa£¿akliz¨¡de turns to the action¡¯s process of occurrence. He states that a human being first makes a preference, then God creates the will towards this preference. When the human being wills it, God brings this act into
%K adr¨¹£¿£¿er£¿a
%K Sa£¿akl£¿zade
%K tercih
%K irade
%K ihtiyar
%K fiil
%K £¿k¨¡¡®
%K hal
%K Mat¨¹r£¿diyye
%K E£¿¡®ariyye
%K Mu¡®tezile
%U http://dergipark.org.tr/isad/issue/42645/513141