%0 Journal Article
%T The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements
%A Kirk Lougheed
%J -
%D 2018
%R https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v38i2.4966
%X Abstract In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts. Dans la litt¨¦rature sur l'¨¦pist¨¦mologie du d¨¦saccord, un argument sous-d¨¦velopp¨¦ pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'id¨¦e qu'il y a des b¨¦n¨¦fices ¨¦pist¨¦miques ¨¤ tirer du d¨¦saccord. De tels b¨¦n¨¦fices sont impossibles ¨¤ obtenir si un agent se concilie face au d¨¦saccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes li¨¦s ¨¤ la recherche. Dans la th¨¦orie de l'argumentation, un d¨¦saccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un d¨¦saccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des d¨¦saccords profonds peuvent mener ¨¤ des avantages ¨¦pist¨¦miques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la r¨¦solution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de d¨¦saccord profond, leur existence s'av¨¨re ¨ºtre b¨¦n¨¦fique sur le plan ¨¦pist¨¦mologique
%U https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4966