%0 Journal Article
%T Executive remuneration determinants: New evidence from meta-analysis
%A Blanes
%A F¨˘bian
%A Porcuna
%A Rub¨¦n
%J -
%D 2020
%R 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1678503
%X SaŁżetak This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay¨Cperformance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay¨Cperformance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation
%K C.E.O. compensation
%K C.E.O. pay
%K pay¨Cperformance
%K corporate governance
%K managerial power theory
%K meta-analysis
%U https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=334117