%0 Journal Article
%T Quine's Poor Tom
%A Haze
%A Tristan Gr£¿tvedt
%J -
%D 2019
%R 10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
%X Sa£¿etak Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine¡¯s part
%K belief contexts
%K referential transparency
%K opacity
%K Quine
%K perspicuity
%U https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=317205