%0 Journal Article %T Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism? %A K¨¹rbis %A Nils %J - %D 2018 %R 10.31820/ejap.14.2.3 %X Sa£¿etak This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege¡¯s definition of that term in ¡ì3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of numerical non-identities must appeal to primitive incompatibilities. I argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. Hence incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans %K analyticity %K arithmetic %K falsity %K incompatibility %K negation %U https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=317180