%0 Journal Article
%T Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?
%A Joakim
%A Sahar
%A Ragland
%A C. P.
%J -
%D 2018
%R 10.31820/ejap.14.2.2
%X Sa£¿etak In Metaphysical Themes, Robert Pasnau interprets Thomas Hobbes as an anti-realist about all accidents in general. In opposition to Pasnau, we argue that Hobbes is a realist about some accidents (e.g., motion and magnitude). Section One presents Pasnau¡¯s position on Hobbes; namely, that Hobbes is an unqualified anti-realist of the eliminativist sort. Section Two offers reasons to reject Pasnau¡¯s interpretation. Hobbes explains that magnitude is mind-independent, and he offers an account of perception in terms of motion (understood as a mind-independent feature of body). Therefore, it seems incorrect to call Hobbes an anti-realist about all accidents. Section Three considers Pasnau¡¯s hypothetical response: he might claim that for Hobbes, motion reduces to body and does not exist in its own right. Section Four notes that reductionism about all accidents does not entail anti-realism about all accidents. Even granting Pasnau¡¯s anticipated response, his anti-realist reading does not follow. Contra Pasnau, Hobbes is best understood as claiming that motion and magnitude exist mind-independently
%K Hobbes
%K Pasnau
%K antirealism about accidents
%K body
%K motion
%U https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=311094