%0 Journal Article
%T How Do We Know That We Are Free?
%A O¡¯Connor
%A Timothy
%J -
%D 2019
%R 10.31820/ejap.15.2.4
%X Sa£¿etak We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ¡®up to us¡¯ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe the source and epistemic justification of our ¡®freedom belief¡¯. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available to incompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the ¡®privileged¡¯ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature of freedom itself
%K Free will
%K freedom experience
%K incompatibilism
%K a priori justification
%K conscious awareness
%K revisionism
%U https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=334300