%0 Journal Article
%T A Paradox in Polarization? Cross
%A Benjamin T. Toll
%J World Affairs
%@ 1940-1582
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/0043820019825934
%X Members of the public are often left choosing between two extreme candidates who will not represent the moderate, aggregate, public effectively. Cross-pressured members of the U.S. Congress serve a constituency that votes for the opposite party at the national level. If there is any group of representatives that have an incentive to moderate their voting behavior, it is cross-pressured members. In this article, I show that cross-pressured members are more moderate than the average member of their party. This could provide constraints on rampant partisanship in the form of districts that are comfortable electing a representative of one party and voting for the president of the other. However, I show that these members are significantly less likely to be reelected. Thus a paradox exists in which cross-pressured members who moderate their voting behavior are no more likely to be rewarded for behaving the way citizens claim they want to represent
%K Political Parties
%K Polarization
%K Moderate
%K Moderation
%K United States
%K Congress
%K Representation
%K Cross-pressured Congressmen
%K Partisanship
%K House of Representatives
%K Partidos políticos
%K Polarización
%K Moderado
%K Estados Unidos
%K Congreso
%K Representación
%K Congresistas de presión cruzada
%K Partidismo
%K Cámara de Representantes
%K 政党
%K 两极分化
%K 温和
%K 美国
%K 国会
%K 代表
%K 交叉压力下的国会议员
%K 党派关系
%K 众议院
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0043820019825934