%0 Journal Article
%T Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
%A Friedel Bolle
%J Journal of Theoretical Politics
%@ 1460-3667
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/0951629818791041
%X In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ¡®true majority¡¯ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ¡®true majority¡¯ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results
%K Binary decisions
%K free riding
%K unique pure strategy equilibria
%K voting
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0951629818791041