%0 Journal Article
%T How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been
%A Michael Otsuka
%J Politics, Philosophy & Economics
%@ 1741-3060
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/1470594X17731394
%X In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also matters. My attempt to reconcile contractualist and consequentialist approaches proceeds via a serious of reflections on cases
%K contractualism
%K consequentialism
%K complaints
%K non-identity problem
%K Parfit
%K no difference view
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1470594X17731394