%0 Journal Article
%T ¡°A Little Is Better Than Zero¡± or ¡°Pay Enough or Don¡¯t Pay at All¡±? Evidence on the Size of Pay
%A Chung-An Chen
%J Public Personnel Management
%@ 1945-7421
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/0091026017747298
%X Regarding the effect of pay-for-performance (PFP), standard economic reasoning suggests that ¡°a little is better than zero,¡± meaning that even small performance payments can improve employees¡¯ work morale. An alternative view, ¡°pay enough or don¡¯t pay at all,¡± suggests that paying too little may instead erode employees¡¯ work morale. Using the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data, the present study finds evidence that the two views actually complement each other: Small payments can improve employees¡¯ work effort (e.g., working hours), but can also potentially compromise their work attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction). In addition, employees in different working sectors may have different understanding of what ¡°small size¡± really means. Findings are followed by theoretical and practical implications
%K performance pay
%K pay size
%K self-determination theory
%K public¨Cprivate comparison
%K motivation crowding
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0091026017747298