%0 Journal Article %T Are complex game models empirically relevant? %A Catherine C. Langlois %J Conflict Management and Peace Science %@ 1549-9219 %D 2018 %R 10.1177/0738894217733889 %X This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont¡¯s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model. Finally it assesses the link between empirical relevance and complexity with reference to models in the crisis bargaining and the war and bargaining literatures %K Empirical relevance %K game theory %K model complexity %U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0738894217733889