%0 Journal Article
%T Are complex game models empirically relevant?
%A Catherine C. Langlois
%J Conflict Management and Peace Science
%@ 1549-9219
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/0738894217733889
%X This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont¡¯s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model. Finally it assesses the link between empirical relevance and complexity with reference to models in the crisis bargaining and the war and bargaining literatures
%K Empirical relevance
%K game theory
%K model complexity
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0738894217733889