%0 Journal Article
%T Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic
%A Christian Schuster
%A Virginia Oliveros
%J Comparative Political Studies
%@ 1552-3829
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/0010414017710268
%X Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some public servants¡ªyet not others¡ªwork hard to deliver public services, misuse state resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: Bureaucratic structures shift behavior toward integrity, neutrality, and commitment to public service. Our study conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber was right¡ªbut only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only decreases political services: Tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality of democracy
%K bureaucracy
%K merit
%K patronage
%K tenure
%K conjoint experiment
%K Weber
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414017710268