%0 Journal Article
%T The self
%A Peter Bornschein
%J Politics, Philosophy & Economics
%@ 1741-3060
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/1470594X18762256
%X Recently, Eric Mack, Edward Feser, and Daniel Russell have argued that self-ownership justifies a constraint on the use of property such that an owner¡¯s use of property may not severely negate the ability of others to interact with the world. Mack has labeled this constraint the self-ownership proviso. Adopting this proviso promises right-libertarians a way of avoiding the extreme implications of a no-proviso view, while maintaining a consistent and cohesive position (in contrast, arguably, to Nozick¡¯s understanding and endorsement of Locke¡¯s proviso). Nevertheless, I argue that self-ownership cannot ground the constraint on property use that Mack, Feser, and Russell think that it can
%K self-ownership
%K self-ownership proviso
%K libertarianism
%K right-libertarianism
%K property
%K Eric Mack
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1470594X18762256