%0 Journal Article
%T Justice and justification
%A Harvey Siegel
%J Theory and Research in Education
%@ 1741-3192
%D 2018
%R 10.1177/1477878518801753
%X Is good reasoning in the moral domain different from its counterpart in non-moral domains? What counts as a good moral argument, or a valid moral assertion or claim? What does ¡®validity¡¯ mean in the moral realm? Lots of ink has been spilled on these and related questions in the past few decades, but not much has been settled. In what follows I will spill a little more, this time with the hope that bringing epistemic concerns directly to bear on them might shed some light. A particular focus will be J¨¹rgen Habermas¡¯ discourse ethics and its conceptions of communicative rationality and ideal discourse. I will try to show that Habermas and some of his defenders in the philosophy of education literature fail to get the epistemology right and, as a result, both their defenses of Habermasian communicative rationality and critiques of non-Habermasian alternatives fail as well. I will also argue that these epistemic failures do not threaten their Habermas-based educational recommendations, which can be justified on other, more straightforwardly moral, grounds
%K Dialogicality
%K discourse ethics
%K educational justice
%K epistemic criteria
%K Habermas
%K justification
%K moral epistemology
%K virtue
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1477878518801753