%0 Journal Article
%T 中国货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调搭配研究<br>The Coordination of Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudental Policy in China
%A 吴智华
%A 温 军
%A 李 敏
%J 西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）
%D 2019
%R 10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.201905007
%X 本文通过构建包含住房贷款抵押比和商业银行资本监管两种宏观审慎政策工具以及内生化商业银行决策的DSGE模型,从合作与非合作均衡的视角探究了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的协调搭配问题。研究表明:(1)货币政策与宏观审慎政策相互合作能够实现更低的社会福利损失,该损失降低的程度与冲击类型相关,住房需求冲击和企业家资本收益风险冲击下两者之间相互合作的福利所得明显;(2)货币政策应与宏观审慎政策就信贷水平目标相互沟通,宏观审慎应以金融稳定为唯一目标,即使其目标函数中关注产出缺口,也不应将其作为决策变量;(3)在货币政策和总需求冲击下,宏观审慎当局仅需使用银行资本监管工具,而在其余外生冲击下,单一的宏观审慎政策工具通过金融机构的监管套利行为会引发宏观经济长期波动性加剧,宏观审慎政策需要多种工具相互配合,共同降低监管政策的整体外溢效应。<br>This paper constructs a DSGE model which includes two macro-prudential regulatory policy tools: mortgage ratio of housing loans and capital regulation of commercial banks, and endogenous commercial banks’ decision-making. It explores the coordination and collocation between monetary policy and macro-prudential regulatory policy from the perspective of cooperation and non-cooperation equilibrium. Research shows: 1)The cooperation between monetary policy and macro-prudential supervision policy can achieve lower social welfare loss, the degree of loss reduction is related to the types of shocks, and the spillover effect of monetary policy shocks to strengthen the response to credit fluctuations is much smaller. 2)Monetary policy should communicate with macro-prudential regulatory policy on credit objectives, the macro-prudential regulatory policy should take financial stability as its sole objective, even if it pays attention to the fluctuation of output gap in its objective function, it should not be regarded as a decision variable. 3)In order to avoid arbitrage caused by a single regulatory policy tool, macro-prudential regulatory policies need a variety of tools to cooperate with each other to minimize the overall spillover effect of regulatory policies
%K 货币政策
%K 宏观审慎政策
%K 监管套利
%K 金融稳定
%K 社会福利
%K DSGE模型<br>monetary policy
%K macro prudential policy
%K regulatory arbitrage
%K financial stability
%K social welfare
%K DSGE model
%U http://skxb.xjtu.edu.cn/oa/DArticle.aspx?type=view&id=201905007