%0 Journal Article
%T 高管持股:“堑壕防御”还是“利益趋同”――基于内部控制的决定作用
Managerial Ownership: Entrenchment or Convergence-of-Interest ―Based on the decisive effect of internal control
%A 董竹
%A 马鹏飞
%J 西安交通大学学报(社会科学版)
%D 2019
%R 10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.201903003
%X 本文以2011―2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,分析在内部控制作用下,高管持股所带来的“堑壕防御”与“利益趋同”效应。研究发现,当内部控制质量低于门槛值时,上市公司内部控制制度存在缺陷,无法对管理者形成有效的监督与激励,高管持股出现堑壕防御效应,增加代理成本,降低公司经营绩效;当内部控制质量高于门槛值时,上市公司内部控制制度较为完善,能够对管理者形成有效的监督与激励,高管持股出现利益趋同效应,降低代理成本,提高公司经营绩效。此外,高于内部控制质量门槛值的公司年均占比接近90%,表明A股上市公司的高管持股能够发挥利益趋同效应,股权激励有效。因此,上市公司应当在完善内部控制的基础上,开展股权激励,进而提高公司治理水平与经营绩效。
Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, we establish a panel threshold model, in which the threshold variable is internal control, to analyse the effect of managerial ownership on corporate governance. The results show, there exists an obviously nonlinearity relationship between proportion of managerial ownership and agency cost or operating performance based on internal control. If internal control quality is lower than the threshold, internal control system cannot supervise and motive managers due to the defects. Agency cost will be improved and operating performance will be reduced lead by entrenchment effects. If internal control quality is higher than the threshold, internal control system supervises and motives managers effectively, and agency cost will be reduced and operating performance will be improved lead by convergence-of-interest effects. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result implies that, more than 90% listed companies’ internal control quality are higher than the threshold, so convergence-of-interest effects are mainstream in Chinese capital market. Finally, we suggest that companies should adopt equity incentive plan based on a good internal control system, then improve governance level and corporate value
%K 内部控制
%K 高管持股
%K 股权激励
%K 堑壕防御
%K 利益趋同
%K 代理成本
%K 公司绩效
internal control
%K managerial ownership
%K equity incentive
%K entrenchment
%K convergence??of??interest
%K agency cost
%K operating performance
%U http://skxb.xjtu.edu.cn/oa/DArticle.aspx?type=view&id=201903003