%0 Journal Article
%T Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?
%A Laura Valentini
%J Ethics & Global Politics
%D 2019
%R https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606
%X ABSTRACT Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard £¿verland¡¯s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ¡®at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others¡¯. Barry and £¿verland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and £¿verland¡¯s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and £¿verland¡¯s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete
%U https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606