%0 Journal Article %T The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller¡¯s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox %A Peter Eldridge-Smith %J Open Journal of Philosophy %P 152-171 %@ 2163-9442 %D 2019 %I Scientific Research Publishing %R 10.4236/ojpp.2019.92011 %X It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides a significant example. The Liar paradox can be defused to a hypodox by relatively minimally restricting three principles: the T-schema, substitution of identicals and universal instantiation. These restrictions are not arbitrary. For each, I identify the source of a contradiction given some presumptions. Then I propose each restriction as a reasonable way to deal with that source of contradiction. %K Liar paradox %K Hypodox %K Truth %K T-Schema %K Substitution of Identicals %U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=92294