%0 Journal Article
%T 内部监督对盈余管理行为的抑制作用研究——基于高管变更的视角<br>Research of Inhibition to Earnings Management of Internal Supervision--Based on the Perspective of Top Executives Replacement
%A 陈共荣
%A 王慧
%A 谢珊珊
%J 财经理论与实践
%D 2015
%X 完善的内部监督机制是提高公司治理效率的关键，能有效抑制高管变更时的盈余管理行为。以沪深A股上市公司2010~2013年数据，用多元回归方法进行实证检验，结果发现：发生高管变更的企业，高管变更当年存在较为严重的负向盈余管理行为；董事会监督效率越高、监事会越勤勉,以及大股东制衡度越大，该负向盈余管理行为越能得到抑制。鉴此,宜加强企业内部监督机制建设,完善公司治理。<br>Perfect internal supervision mechanism is usually the key to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.It is useful to restrain the earnings management caused by top executives replacement? We make the research based on the data from 2010 to 2013 Chinese listed company using the multiple regression analysis. The results indicate that top executives replacement causes the decrease of discretionary accruals, and the higher efficiency of the board supervision, the more diligent of the supervisory board，the greater balance of the ownership, can more effectively suppress the decrease of accruals. All of these show that the reasonable internal supervision is useful for a company to weaken managers' misconducts effectively, and to strengthen the construction of internal supervision mechanism is the eternal theme of corporate governance.
%K 公司治理 内部监督 高管变更 盈余管理&lt
%K br&gt
%K Corporate governance Internal supervision Top executives replacement Earnings management
%U http://hdxbcjb.cnjournals.net/ch/reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=20150312&flag=1