%0 Journal Article
%T 具有涉他偏好的地方官员晋升锦标激励研究<br>An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Incentive of China′s Local Officials under Other-Regarding Preference
%A 张晶
%A 韩李利
%A 梁巧转
%A 唐梦媛
%J 西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）
%D 2015
%X 将行为人涉他偏好（嫉妒和自豪）因素引入地方官员政治晋升博弈模型中，考察了其对地方官员行为的影响。结果显示：涉他偏好对地方官员产生了更高的先验激励，在加剧同级官员之间竞争、促使地方官员付出更多努力的同时，还改变了社会福利水平和地方官员对区域合作抑或分割的行为选择；处于竞争劣势的官员会在维持发展型努力的同时采取“攫取之手”并提高其保留效用；地方官员在合作时倾向于同所辖区域发展水平相差较大的区域，而非发展水平相近的区域。<br>In this paper,by introducing assumption of agent′s other-regarding preference from organization and psychological game experiment,a simple model of political promotion game is presented in order to investigate the effects of envy and egoistic psychological factors on officials behavior. It turns out that officials exert higher efforts than other-regarding preference officials. Contrary to previous promotion models,ex ant incentives from other-regarding preference promote the level of social welfare and the officials choice of corporation or fragmentation. When Officials at a competitive disadvantage maintain developmental efforts,they will take measures like "grabbing a hand" to improve their reservation utility;Besides,local officials tend to cooperate with the areas which are comparatively different at regional development level,rather than at a similar level of development area
%K 政治晋升
%K 锦标赛模型
%K 涉他偏好
%K 区域合作与分割&lt
%K br&gt
%K political promotion
%K tournament model
%K other-regarding preference
%K rational corporation and fragmentation
%U http://skxb.xjtu.edu.cn/oa/DArticle.aspx?type=view&id=201501009