%0 Journal Article
%T 基于效用理论的气候谈判博弈策略模型<br>Strategic game model for climate change negotiations based on utility theory
%A 王灿
%A 金朱钢
%A 蔡闻佳
%J 清华大学学报（自然科学版）
%D 2015
%X 基于效用理论, 从博弈视角模拟气候谈判框架下各国谈判策略。首先识别气候变化投资对各国效用的正向、 负向和外溢效应; 其次在增温幅度、温度对GDP(国内生产总值)增速影响等不确定性下求得各国静态博弈对策; 最后通过动态化博弈行为, 对气候谈判中先动劣势的存在性提出检验方法。典型案例模拟结果表明: 气候谈判策略的确存在先动劣势, 各国倾向于等待并迫使别国先做出减排承诺, 该博弈分析印证了气候谈判现状。<br>Abstract：A game theory model incorporating utility theory was used to analyze climate change strategies for different countries. The model includes the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change related investments, temperature change uncertainties and their effects on GDP (gross domestic product) growth. The strategies are dynamic to test for the existence of the first-mover disadvantage. The first-mover disadvantage hypothesis is also confirmed by a typical real case. The strategic model indicates that each country should wait and urge others to make promises in advance, as has been seen in real negotiations.
%K 气候谈判
%K 效用理论
%K 博弈
%K 策略模型
%K &lt
%K br&gt
%K climate change negotiations
%K utility theory
%K game theory
%K strategic model
%U http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2015/V55/I9/1017