%0 Journal Article
%T 基于标尺竞争的地方政府土地出让行为互动<br>Effect of local governments' land leasing behavior based on yardstick competition
%A 龙奋杰
%A 王萧濛
%A 邹迪
%J 清华大学学报（自然科学版）
%D 2015
%X 在中国特殊的土地出让和官员政绩评价背景下, 政府间标尺竞争使得同级政府在土地供给上产生相互影响, 即所谓的土地出让行为互动。该文利用理论分析和实证检验, 通过引入要素流动条件, 理论推导出向上和向下的标尺竞争会导致产业用地出让比例受到相关政府决策的影响, 再利用空间计量模型对177个地级及以上城市的经营性土地出让数据进行实证检验。结果表明: 向上的标尺竞争会导致地方政府在出让居住和工业用地时关注与其经济排名接近的政府决策, 回归结果均在0.1%水平上显著; 向下的标尺竞争, 因其作用渠道为招商引资, 故工业用地出让比重仍呈现明显的空间相关性, 而居住用地的政府间行为互动不再显著。<br>Abstract：This study theoretically and empirically analyzes how a yardstick competition influences a local governments' land leasing behavior spatially for a Chinese particular land supply system. The ratio of the industrial land to total land supply is shown to be affected by other governments'decisions due to yardstick competition from “top” and “bottom” when mobility factors are included through tests of the horizontal externalities in the land supply in 177 prefecture-level cities. The result shows spatial autocorrelation between local governments and their competitors who rank near them in terms of the ratio of the industrial and residential to total land supply because of the yardstick competition from the “top”, with of significance at 0.1 percent. For yardstick competition from the “bottom”, the coefficient of the spatial lag variable for residential land is no longer significant while industrial land maintains its ability to attract factors like labor and capital.
%K 标尺竞争
%K 土地供给
%K 行为互动
%K 空间计量模型
%K &lt
%K br&gt
%K yardstick competition
%K land supply
%K interaction behavior
%K spatial econometric model
%U http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2015/V55/I9/971#FigureTableTab