%0 Journal Article
%T 两种内在哲学之比较——西田几多郎与叔本华的对话
%A [日]板桥勇仁
%J 复旦学报(社会科学版)
%D 2017
%X 本文集中探讨了西田几多郎的“内在”哲学,并试图将其思想放置于叔本华哲学之经纬中予以考察(众所周知,叔本华的意志论具有将康德的批判哲学彻底化的旨趣)。在笔者看来,在西田建立起其大名鼎鼎的“场所逻辑”思想之时,其所给出的一则评论其实已经包含了使得上述思想得以被建立的关键线索。相关论述的文本根据,则是通常被评判为“西田中期作品”的《从动者到见者》一书(1927年出版)。与叔本华哲学遥相呼应的是,西田的哲学立场的真正旨趣,通常被学界把握为对于“康德式的批判主义”的彻底化。对西田而言,这种彻底化进程的实质就在于:关于那些牵涉到经验本性的哲学预设被摒弃得越多,那么这种“彻底化进程”就会被执行得越好。而在这些需要被摒弃的哲学预设之中,有一个预设的内容便是这样的:所谓“独立于客体的认识主体或意识”的确是“实在”的一部分。另一个预设则是这样的:独立于经验的客体亦的确是“实在”的另一部分。而为了与这些流俗意见相对抗,西田建立起了一种“内在”的观点,并经由这种观点将主体或意识视为“场所”——在这种“场所”中,主体和客体都被置于其中,或是被包含于其中。西田的这一评论清楚地表明了他的“场所哲学”不单单是经由东亚的思想资源(或是他本人的宗教体验)而诞生的,其创生同时也已借助了康德哲学的东风。换言之,他比康德本人更为彻底地贯彻了康德式的批判精神,由此才构成了西田本人所说的“彻底的批判主义的立场”。而这种对于批判哲学的彻底化也便构成了西田哲学与叔本华哲学之间的契合点。此外,考虑到叔本华的“内在哲学”是基于“对于生存意志之否定”这一概念的,在笔者看来,西田对内在哲学的彻底化其实也是通过“否定那个不断索求事物之根据的意志本身”才得以实现的。</br>Abstract：This study shall focus on the “immanent” philosophy of Nishida Kitarō, compared with that of Arthur Schopenhauer, who developed the notion of “will” in order to radicalize the Kantian critical philosophy. Nishida made a passing remark that he found an important clue for establishing his own philosophical standpoint through the idea of “place (basho),” i.e., an idea that was first formulated in his 1927 book From the Acting to the Seeing, a work that belongs to his middle period philosophy. His philosophical standpoint always remained nothing other than what he considered as a radicalization of “Kantian criticism,” which included, for Nishida, the abandonment of as many philosophical presumptions as possible regarding the nature of experience. One such presumption would be the reality of an independent cognizant subject or consciousness. Another would be the reality of objects independent of experience. Nishida raises such an “immanent” standpoint of the subject (or consciousness) as “basho” in which both subjects and objects are enclosed. This remark clearly suggests that his philosophy of basho was brought into being not simply through East Asian thinking or through his religious experience, but also by means of pursuing the spirit of Kantian critique further than Kant himself, which Nishida understood as “the standpoint of radical criticism.” Considering Schopenhauer's “immanent” philosophy based on the notion of “denial of will,” Nishida's radicalization of immanent critical philosophy is only accomplishable if it is united with the negation of the will probing for a ground.
%U http://www.fdwkxb.fudan.edu.cn/CN/abstract/abstract1650.shtml