%0 Journal Article
%T 自由与自然必然性的对立——克里斯蒂安·伽尔韦的问题与康德的解决
%A [德]H.F.克勒梅
%J 复旦学报(社会科学版)
%D 2018
%X 为了进一步澄清康德伦理学的立场,作者将康德伦理学置于一场命定论与任意论的争论之中。伽尔韦尝试在一种怀疑论的不可知论立场上调和这两种观点,认为由于我们能够确信德性的实在性,所以作为现实的自然必然性和作为道德之前提的自由这两种立场必定能够结合起来,在这里需要负责的并不是道德的现实性,而是我们思辨能力的不足。而康德却与此相反,他认为,伽尔韦这种基于怀疑主义的自然与自由的相容论在论证上和命定论之间有着某种关联。如果道德哲学不能合法地肯定自由的现实性,那么命定论者就能够理所当然地占有这块领地,道德哲学就处在危险的境地之中。因此,康德运用一种在诉讼中使用的“授权”和“演绎”方法,将论证负担交给对手,即不是直接证明自由的现实性,而是要求命定论者在事实上证明自由的不可能性。而根据先验观念论对思辨理性的批判,后者的论证是不可能完成的。因此,道德哲学就能够通过对自由概念在道德领域中的运用这一实践判断而非事实判断,完成对自由的合法肯定。</br>Abstract：In the second paper of this serial, the author situates Kantian Ethics again within the context of a debate concerning the fatalism and indifferentism. Christian Garve tries to reconcile these two radically contrasted positions from the standpoint of skeptical ignorance. According to Garve, since our belief in virtue comes before all systems, if we do not find a convincing system of concepts to explain our belief in the existence of virtue, then, we should give up the system rather than suspend our belief in the existence of virtue. But Kant claims that, Garve's compatibilism position of nature and freedom has a narrow argumentative connection to the fatalism position. In other words, if practical philosophy is not capable of provide a legitimate declare of the reality of freedom, then the fatalists will justifiably occupy this bonum vacans. Hence Kant tries to make use of a litigant argumentation of the deduction of authority, in order to justifying the reality of freedom, not by a direct demonstration of the conclusion, but by a sort of deductio ad absurdum which transfers the task to the opponents who have to demonstrate the impossibility of the freedom. And this task is impossible according to the critic of the theoretical reason under the transcendental idealism. Therefore the practical philosophy can justifiably declare the reality of freedom with the practical fact that we can make use of it in the moral territory. Finally, the conflict between nature and freedom is not compromised through a theoretical way but through a practical understanding to our “real self.” The author treats Kant's practical deduction of moral freedom as a “weak and negative” argument, and defends Kant's transcendental argument in Groundwork III from the pervasive criticism.
%K 命定论
%K 任意论
%K 自由
%K 演绎&lt
%K /br&gt
%K fatalism
%K indifferentism
%K freedom
%K deduction
%U http://www.fdwkxb.fudan.edu.cn/CN/abstract/abstract2307.shtml