%0 Journal Article
%T 关于一类风险投资的动态博弈模型及分析<br>A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
%A 麦均洪
%J 控制理论与应用
%D 2016
%R 10.7641/CTA.2016.40093
%X “套牢”是在各类投资行为里广泛存在的问题. 本文以高新技术企业和风险投资机构之间的合作研发行为 为基础, 基于不完全契约理论的建模方法, 在动态博弈的框架内引入讨价还价因子对其中的“套牢”问题进行了分 析. 研究结果表明, 讨价还价能力是影响是否存在研发激励不足问题的一个重要因素, 在不受到有限责任约束的情 形下, 如果高新技术企业讨价还价能力更强, 对其研发激励也更强, 而在受到有限责任约束时, 高新技术企业在研发 阶段的投资激励则随其讨价还价能力的增强而减弱. 最后通过一个算例对所得到的结论进行了检验.<br>The hold-up problem is an interesting issue in incomplete contract theory for different kinds of investment behaviors. It has been agreed that hold-up would result of insufficient investment. For the cooperative R & D between high-tech companies and venture investor, this paper builds a dynamic game model which includes the bargaining power to analyze the hold-problem. The analysis results imply that bargaining power between high-tech companies and venture investor is an important factor and affect the invest incentive of high-tech companies. If there has no limited liability constraint, investment incentive will increase with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power, otherwise investment incentive will decrease with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power. Finally, the results are verified by a specific example.
%K 不完全契约 套牢 讨价还价 有限责任约束 动态博弈&lt
%K br&gt
%K incomplete contract hold-up bargaining limited liability constraint dynamic game
%U http://jcta.alljournals.ac.cn/cta_cn/ch/reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=CCTA140093&flag=1