%0 Journal Article
%T 良知:能力之知还是动力之知?——对郁振华与黄勇之争的一个评论
%A 黄家光
%J 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
%D 2018
%R 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2018.05.003
%X 摘要 郁振华与黄勇两位教授就王阳明良知概念展开争论。郁振华认为良知是道德能力之知，黄勇认为良知是道德动力之知。黄勇指责郁振华延续了赖尔对disposition的误用，导致对良知的错误归类。要回应黄勇的批评，就必须回应"有心无力之人"，继而经由考察插秧能手和孝子的案例，揭示黄勇对爱好者概念的误用，凸显冲突的动力结构中的判断力维度，即"明辨是非善恶"，说明能力之知是道德能力之知的必要不充分条件，并进一步通过排他性来界定道德能力之知。</br>Abstract：There is a debate on WANG Yang-ming's notion of liangzhi between YU Zhen-hua and HUANG Yong. YU believes that liangzhi is moral knowing-how while HUANG considers that it is moral knowing-to. HUANG criticizes that YU's misusing of the concept of disposition,which can be traced back to G. Ryle,has led to the wrong classification of liangzhi. To respond to HUANG's critiques,we must analyze the phenomenon of a person with moral knowing-to but no knowing-how. Then the examination on cases of a good hand of planting rice and a filial son shows HUANG's misusing of the concept of fancier. The revelation of the dimension of judgment in the conflicting structure of knowing-to,namely the capacity to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil,shows that knowing-how is a not sufficient for moral knowing-how although it is necessary. Furthermore,this paper defines moral knowing-how in terms of exclusiveness.
%K 道德能力之知
%K 道德动力之知
%K 有心无力之人
%K 判断力
%K &lt
%K /br&gt
%K moral knowing-how
%K moral knowing-to
%K a person with moral knowing-to but no knowing-how
%K judgment
%U http://xbzs.ecnu.edu.cn/CN/abstract/abstract11269.shtml