%0 Journal Article
%T 论公司法任意性规范中的软家长主义 ――以股东压制问题为例
%A 潘林
%J 法制与社会发展
%D 2017
%X 我国公司法历经了从管制到自治的变迁，但自治并不必然带来效率，公司自治在回应以股东压制为典型代表的公司机会主义行为方面具有局限性。在由缺省性规则、赋权性规则、章程示范文本等共同构成的公司自治选择架构中，不同于为降低交易成本而因循的规则设计的多数路径，贯彻降低代理成本的立场将导向软家长主义的规则设计路径，从而矫正信息与权力的不对称，克服现状偏见，敦促主体做出理性选择。由此，重新设计公司自治的选择架构，设置惩罚性缺省并形成清单式指引将在保全主体选择自由的前提下促成对小股东的保护，进而有效回应股东压制问题，实现软家长主义对公司自治的提升。</br>Corporate law in China has undergone the transition from regulation to autonomy. Yet autonomy does not necessarily bring about efficiency. Corporate autonomy has its limitation in responding to opportunism, which is represented by shareholder oppression. As to the choice architecture of corporate autonomy that is composed of enabling rules, default rules and model articles of association, different from the majoritarian approach that aims to reduce transaction cost, reducing agency cost would lead to soft paternalism, thus it help to rectify the asymmetry of power as well as information, overcome status quo bias, and nudge the parties toward rationality. Manipulating choice architecture of corporate autonomy and setting up penalty default and menu could offer protection for minority shareholders under the premise of the freedom of choice, and deal with shareholder oppression effectively and improve corporate autonomy by soft paternalism.
%K 公司自治
%K 股东压制
%K 软家长主义
%K 选择架构
%K 任意性规范&lt
%K /br&gt
%K Corporate Autonomy
%K Shareholder Oppression
%K Soft Paternalism
%K Choice Architecture
%K Optional Rule
%U http://fzyshfz.paperonce.org/oa/DArticle.aspx?type=view&id=201701005