%0 Journal Article %T Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games %A Branislav Bosansky %A Simina Branzei %A Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen %A Peter Bro Miltersen %A Troels Bjerre Sorensen %J Computer Science %D 2015 %I arXiv %X The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken in favor of the leader). We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games (or extensive-form games) and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for several classes of these sequential games. %U http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07677v1