%0 Journal Article
%T Unique Theory of Mind Differentiation in Children with Autism and Asperger Syndrome
%A Michele Tine
%A Joan Lucariello
%J Autism Research and Treatment
%D 2012
%I Hindawi Publishing Corporation
%R 10.1155/2012/505393
%X This study was designed to determine if ToM abilities of children with autism and Asperger syndrome differentiate into Intrapersonal ToM and Social ToM. A battery of Social and Intrapersonal ToM tasks was administered to 39 children with autism and 34 children with Asperger syndrome. For both groups of children, ToM differentiated and Intrapersonal ToM was stronger than Social ToM. This asymmetry was greater for children with autism, whose Social ToM was especially weak. These results support a differentiated, as opposed to integrated, ToM. Moreover, the findings provide a more thorough understanding of the cognitive abilities associated with autism and Asperger syndrome. 1. Introduction Theory of Mind (ToM) entails our imputation of mental states to the self and to others to account for behavior. A foundational question about ToM is whether it is a single unitary construct or differentiates into separable abilities. The predominant accounts of ToM, which are outlined in Table 1, most often advocate an integrated view wherein reasoning about the mental states of self and others are deemed to be one and the same cognitive ability. Table 1: Predominant accounts of Theory of Mind. More specifically, the module proposed by the modularity account is said to automatically compute the mental states of self and others. Similarly, according to theory-theory, the conceptual change that occurs during the replacement of successive theories does not distinguish between the mental states of self and others. The sociocultural account assumes that the social contextual variables that drive ToM development equally affect the development of reasoning about self and others¡¯ mental states. Finally, the language account does not assess if the relationship between aspects of language differs across self and other reasoning. Two theories that refute the integrated view in favor of a differentiated view are the Functional Multilinear Socialization (FMS) Model and simulation theory. These accounts of ToM distinguish reasoning of one¡¯s own and others¡¯ mental states as two distinct cognitive abilities that are not purported to emerge necessarily together at a single ontogenetic point in time. The FMS Model poses that ToM capabilities differentiate into the two distinct cognitive abilities of Social Reasoning (reasoning about others¡¯ mental states) and Intrapersonal Reasoning (reasoning about one¡¯s own mental states) [1, 2]. Moreover, the FMS Model defines Social and Intrapersonal Reasoning in relation to the everyday functions they each play. The Social Reasoning component of ToM
%U http://www.hindawi.com/journals/aurt/2012/505393/