%0 Journal Article
%T Bundling and Consumers¡¯ Reservation  Value: Effects on Market Entry
%A Qing Hu
%J Technology and Investment
%P 77-81
%@ 2150-4067
%D 2015
%I Scientific Research Publishing
%R 10.4236/ti.2015.61008
%X We consider a multiproduct incumbent which monopolizes one market but faces a potential entrant in another market. In a two dimensional Hotelling model, when consumers¡¯ reservation value is relatively high, we show that the incumbent has an incentive to use bundling to deter entry only if a prior commitment is applicable. However, when consumers¡¯ reservation value is low, the multiproduct firm even has no incentive to use bundling and bundling has no effect on entry deterrence.
%K Bundling
%K Entry Deterrence
%K Multiproduct firm
%K Product-Specific Preferences
%U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=54159