%0 Journal Article %T A Scalar Compromise Equilibrium for N-Person Prescriptive Games %A H. W. Corley %A Surachai Charoensri %A Narakorn Engsuwan %J Natural Science %P 1103-1107 %@ 2150-4105 %D 2014 %I Scientific Research Publishing %R 10.4236/ns.2014.613098 %X

A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process is modeled by a suitable scalar transformation (utility function). Each n-tuple of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalar value between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determines an SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much faster than Nash equilibria, for example; and the decision criterion need not be based on the players¡¯ selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromise equilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing it to other solution concepts.

%K Game Theory %K Equilibria %K Scalar Equilibrium %K Compromise Equilibrium %K Scalar Transformation %K Prescriptive Analysis %U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=49056