%0 Journal Article
%T Changes in the Threshold Uncertainty in a Simultaneous Subscription Game
%A Timothy J. Gronberg
%A Hui-Chun Peng
%J Theoretical Economics Letters
%P 263-269
%@ 2162-2086
%D 2014
%I Scientific Research Publishing
%R 10.4236/tel.2014.44036
%X <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align:justify;\">
	<span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\" lang=\"EN-US\">This paper considers a discrete public good subscription game under
threshold uncertainty and private information on valuations and analyzes the
effect of change in cost uncertainty on the private contribution equilibrium
under a simultaneous institution. Comparative statics with respect to the
changes in the cost distribution are derived. We find that if the cost
distribution becomes more dispersed, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread,
the expected total contributions to the public good will decrease. Our
proposition provides a policy implication that if the suppliers are able to
reduce the uncertainty of the cost distribution, the private contribution to
the public good will increase.</span> 
</p>
%K Discrete Public Good
%K Threshold Uncertainty
%K Private Information
%U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=45231