%0 Journal Article %T Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax %A Shuichi Ohori %J Theoretical Economics Letters %P 133-138 %@ 2162-2086 %D 2014 %I Scientific Research Publishing %R 10.4236/tel.2014.42020 %X
This paper compares price and quantity competition in a mixed duopoly with emission tax; in a mixed duopoly, one public firm competes with one private firm in the market. We find that social welfare is the highest when both the firms simultaneously choose price levels. Then, the optimal emission tax is sufficiently lower than the marginal social damage.
%K Mixed Duopoly %K Price Competition %K Quantity Competition %K Environmental Policy %U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=43432